NEW PRODUCr STRATEGIES: WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE TOP PERFORMERS INI'ROIXJCTICN
A successful new product program is the objective of many companies. But most firms miss the mark.
One enviable but small group of companies we uncovered, however, exhibited an unusually positive new product performance.
Consider sane of their results:
o New products had a dramatic impact on corporate performance: new products introduced over the past five years accounted for 47% of sales of these firms! o This group of firms, on average, achieved a 72% commercial success rate for developed products.
o And on a myriad of other measures --meeting objectives, profitability, success versus canpetitors --this one group of companies consistently scored well above average.
Of even greater interest than these impressive peformance results is the fact that these firms shared a common strategy. That is, the companies in this high performance group were very similar to each other in terms of the orientation and direction of their new product programs, and in the types of markets, products and technologies they targeted with their innovation programs.
What distinguished these top performer companies from other firms --the elements of a successful new product strategy --is the topic of this article.
But before we present our results and conclusions, here is some background on the investigation we undertook: the rationale for the study, and how the study was carried out.
BACKGROUND
In a previous article in this journal, we reported the results of a study into hCJN new product performance and strategy are linked (5).
The rationale for such an investigation is straightforeward:
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• N e w products are increasingly seen as the leading edge of corporate strategy. Facing slow growth markets, increasing competition from home and abroad, and a quickening pace of technological development, more and more managers are looking to product innovation as the route to corporate growth and prosperity.
• In the development of a new product strategy, managers have little they can turn to in the traditional literature. Most of the pop..i lar strategy models --portfolio grids, such as the BCG model � deal with existing business units. What is lacking is a systemati c procedure for generating and choosing strategic options (7), including new products and new businesses.
• Little field evidence exists en what makes for a success f ul new product strategy.
In the quest for the secrets to new product success, most studies have focused cn individual new products as the unit of analysis, rather than on the entire new prcxluct program. This approach has been criticized as myopic (1, 9) : the logical ootcome from recommendations of such narrow studies is a conservative, "safe", but low impact new product program (3,4,10,17 ,18) .
This combinaticn of the importance of new product strategy, the lack of strategy concepts for product innovaticn, and the dearth of field evidence on successful firms' strategies was the impetus for the current research. Note that we don't claim that our research stands alone. Others are also probing the prcxluct innovation strategy question : Crawford, who looked at firms' performances and also identified the key elements of a prcxluct innovation charter (6)� and Nystrom and Edvardsson who sought the links between new product strategy and performance (lJ, 14, 15, 16) . But these studies are few.
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The underlying hypothesis of the current investigation is that the new pr<Xluct strate<JY a firm elects determines the performance of the new prduct program. Of course, other variables, such as the nature of the firm and its industry, will also affect performance. But it is principally those variables that are amenable to management action --the new prcduct strategy and how it is linked to performance --that are of interest here.
We described in detail how the data was collected in our first article.
Briefly:
1. Four major blocks of variables, that portray a firm's new product strategy, were identified. A total of 66 separate strategy variables canprised these four blocks (see Exhibit 1).
2.
One hundred and twenty-two industrial prcduct firms with active new pre.duct development programs supplied the data: the strategies they elected, measured on the 66 strategy variables; and the performance results they achieved (nine perfoEnance criteria --see Exhibit 2).
We then used statistical analysis to reduce the 66 strategy elements to 19 underlying and independent strategy dimensions (see Table 1 ). Relationships between each strategy · dimension and performance were investigated, and these results were reported in our original article.
One problem with this type of analysis is that we tend to look at strategies on a dimension-by-dimension basis --lists of strategies that impact positively (or negatively) on performance. With so many lists and elements, it is easy to lose sight of what the research means in terms of management actioo. For managerial pruposes, however, a synthesis approach may be more appropriate. This approach considers strategies, not by developing lists of "good" and "bad" strategy elements, but by describing strategy gestalts or scenarios; that is, packages of strategies that firms actually elected. Recent work in organizational theory on how managers make decisions points to a synthesis approach � working with gestalts or scenarios --as a ' more promising format for strategy evaluation (8, 11, 12 The success, failure and "kill" rates (percent) of products developed in the last five years.
The extent to which the new product program met its performance cbjectives over the last five years.
The importance of the program in generating sales and profits for the canpany.
The extent to which profits derived fran new products exceed the costs of the new product program.
The success of the program relative to canpetitors.
The overall success of the. program --a glcbal rating .
The first two measures were cbtained as percentages. The last five were gauged on zero-to-ten anchored scales. 
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A second concern with this variable-by-variable approach is the fact that no one firm can be found which follows the prescribed strategy; that is, a firm which elects all the positive elements and avoids all the negative. If no firm elects the ideal, then this raises questions about realism and practicality. It is much more reassuring when a group of firms can be identified which actually followed a certain strategy and won!
The current article looks at the strategies that firms actually elected.
It uses a gestalt or scenario approach to s t rategy analysis. Conceptually, we first describe each of the 122 companies in terms of the 19 underlying strategy dimensions (T able 1). We then seek oµt groups or clusters of companies that have similar strategies. Each group of companies becomes a type or strategy scenario. We next "lower the microscope" on each group to see what performance they achieved, ·ana. what strategies they shared. It was in this· way that our elite group of top performers, which shared a common strategy, were uncovered. Exhibit 3 provides details on the data analysis.
RESULTS
Five distinct strategy types or scenarios were uncovered. Each group of firms was characterized by a shared package of new prcduct strategies; at the same time, each group was unique i.e. was qu ite different from the other groups in terms of the 19 strategy dimensions.
The strategy profiles for each group of firms are shown in Exhibit 4.
For example, the Strategy A firms were technologically sophisticated, but lacked a market orientation (reading down Exhibit 4). Using these strategy profiles, we were able to label each strategy type.
A: The Technologically Driven Firm.
B:
The Balanced Strategy.
The five scenarios are:
The Defensive, Focused, Technologically Deficient Firm.
D:
The LON Budget, Conservative Strategy.
E:
The High Budget, Diverse Strategy. -the extent to which the program met performance objectives.
-the importance of the program in generating sales and profits.
-the success rating of the program versus canpetitors.
-the overall success rating of the program Distinct trends could be identified for the other performance criteria.
are shown on the performance maps of Figure 1 .
The results
Cluster membership was also related to company and industry characteristics (ANOVA's and Duncan multiple range tests).
No cluster was specific to any one industry. At the same time, these strategy A firms were decidedly not market oriented (factor 7): a non-market oriented new product process; lacking a marketing group presence; not proactive in market need identification; new product ideas not market derived; and a process dominated by a technical group. Perhaps because of this lack of a market orientation, such firms chose poor markets: their new products took them into l<Yt!J potential, small, low 9r<Yt11 th markets (factor 5); and the markets were not synergestic with the firm's existing marketing resource base (factor 6). But the markets were not highly competitive (factor 8). Finally the products these technologically driven firms developed did not fit the firm's existing product lines --a poo r product fit and focus (factor 3).
1 Factor numbers refer to the dimensions in Table 1 , where a complete description of each factor or dimension is provided.
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The picture emerges of a technologically aggressive and powerful firm, strongly committed to R&D, and tackling higher risk projects; but also a firm canpletely lacking in a market orientation, and which chose (or found itself in) unattractive new pr<Xluct markets. "
Step out" pr<Xlucts --far removed from the current pr<Xluct line --were also a part of this A-type firm's strategy.
B. The Balanced Strategy Firm
A small group of firms, representing only 15.6% of the sample, practiced a balanced strategy. Like the A-type companies, they too were tech nologically sophisticated, oriented and innovative (factor 1). But they balanced this technological prowess with a strong market orientation --the strongest of any firm (f � ctor 7). For example, these strategy B firms had a strongly market oriented new pr<Xluct process; it was dominated by a marketing group; the firm was proactive in identifying market needs; and new pr<Xluct ideas tended to be market derived. Perhaps because of their market sensitivity, these firms eleeted particularly lucrative markets for their new pr<Xlucts: high potential, large and growing markets (factor 5) and non-competitive markets (factor 8:
little price competition; non-intensive competition; potential users dissatisfied with canpetitors' pr<Xlucts; no dominant competitor).
In addition to a strong market orientation married to a technological prowess, these Balanced Strategy firms featured new products with a high degree of fit and focus (factor 3). Their new pr<Xlucts had a similar end-use as their existing products, fit into an existing product line, were in the same product class as the firm's existing products, and were also closely related to each other.
There were other strategy directions which characterized this Balanced Strategy firms (Exhibit 4 gives the total picture). ·But a union of technological prowess, a strong market orientation, a high degree of pr<Xluct fit, and the ability to chose high potential, high growth, non-competitive
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markets, largely separated these B-firms from the rest.
C. The Defensive, Focused, Technologically Deficient-Strategy
One small group of firms (15.6%) simply lacked the technological prowess to be very successful in product innovation. Of all firms, they were the lowest on the two technology dimensions, namely technological soph istication, orientation and innovativeness (factor 1) and product ion and technological synergy (factor 2). Their programs were defensive ones (factor 18): they were aimed at maintaining market share rather than gaining share, featured a minimal search effort for new product ideas and did not rely on market research. In a similar vein, these C-type firms targeted their new products at familar markets (factor 4) --that is, markets the company had served before. And the innovation program was fairly focused (factor 14): their new products were related to each other, were aimed at the same markets, and used related production and development technologies.
Even though these firms stayed with familar markets, they ended up trying to serve new needs --needs they hadn't served before (factor 17) --in these markets. And in spite of a lack of technological prowess, these Strategy C firms tried to develop high quality, superior products (factor 10).
The picture emerges of a "non-strategy", or at best, an inconsistent one: a technological weak firm with a focused, close-to-home, defensive strategy, but sanehON trying to serve new needs with superior products.
D. The LON Budget, Conservative Strategy
This fairly large group of firms (23.8%) had the lowest relative R&D spending of all firms (factor 18) and also lacked technological prowess (factor 1). And they developed undramatic new products (factor 11) : products which did not affect customer use behavior, offered no unique features to users, and did not reduce custaner costs.
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But D-type companies balanced these technological, R&D and product weaknesses with a highly synergistic, stay-close-to-home strategy. They were the most synergistic of all firms in terms of production and technological resources (factor 2). Their new products employed production technologies familiar to _ the firm, and fit the company's prcduction facilities. Further, their new prcducts closely fit the firm's engineering and R&D facilities and skills, and made use of technologies the firm currently possessed. To a lesser extent, these D-firms chose new prcduct markets where they could make use of their current marketing resources (factor 6: same salesforce, distribution channels, advertisin. g and promotion methcds, etc.) Moreover, their new prcducts were closely related to their existing prcducts --a high degree of product fit and foc us (factor 3).
The picture one gains is of a conservative strategy featuring low spending and "ho hum" new products, but balanced by high degrees of technological, prcducticn, marketing and prcduct synergy. prcducts, technologies, markets were not related to each other, and were highly diverse.
o They attacked new markets for the firm (factor 4) .
o They featured a low degree of production and technological synergy (factor 1) and a lON level of prcx1uct fit and focus (factor 3) .
Coincindently, these "big spenders" ended up in hig hly competitive new prcduct markets (Factor 8). Further analysis revealed that major performance differences existed between strategy types. These performance differences are shown in the form of performance maps �-see Figure 1 .
Here we've taken seven key performance measures, and shown the locations. of strategy groups on the maps. 2 For example, in the first map in Figure 1 (upper left), percent sales by new products and product success rates are both shown (north-south and east-west axes). Here we see that Strategy C firms did poo rly on both dimensions.
A quick review of these performance maps reveals that one strategy -- Figure 1 . Locations of the five strategy types on performance maps.
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had the largest proportion of sales generated from new products (46. 7% versus 34.5% for the other firms );
had the best success rates of developed prcxiucts (72. 3% versus 66.3% for the other firms ); and were essentially tied for first place in terms of program profitability.
Of all strategy types, our Balanced Strategy B-type firms fared the best, on most measures, and by a considerable margin. Here's how all five strategy performed, in order of performance (see Figure 1) :
The Balanced Strategy Satisfactory performance: a profitable program with a high success rate, but one which had relatively little impact on canpany sales and profits.
Mcxierate performance: a high impact program, but plagued by a la,,;r success rate and la,,;r profitability.
Poor results: deficient on most performance measures.
Poor results: deficient on most performance measures . -the new prcrluct process is stongly market oriented; -the process is daninated by a marketing group; -the firm is proactive in market need identification; -new prcrluct ideas are market derived; -and the process is not daninated by a technical group.
The third orientation which distinguishes these top performers is program focus --that is, having a rifle rather than a shot gun approach to new Finally, these firms tended to chose markets whose needs the firm had served before. That is, even though the market itself might have been new to the firm, the needs the firm served with its new prcducts were familiar ones to the firm.
These high performance firms also selected certain types of new prcducts:
o A high degree of prcduct fit and focus.
o Premium priced prcducts.
o Non custan prcducts.
Our high performer firms, first, selected new prcducts which closely fit into JPIM-22 the current business and prcxluct line. These ''high fit" new prcxlucts ••• -have a similar end-use to the firm's existing prcxlucts; -fit into the firmis existing prcxluct lines; -are in the same prcxluct class as the firm's existing prcxlucts; -and �re closely related to each other --focused.
The firm appeared to avoid deliberately a strategy of custom new products;
that is, products that were custom designed and aimed at one or a few customers. Finally, premium priced prcxlucts were a factor in these winning firms' strategies --the opposite of a low cost, high volume approach.
Coincidently, these firms did feature new products with a differential advantage, which helps to explain the premium price strategy. Two types of prcxluct advantage were uncovered in the study: ·
. Product quality am superiority (factor 10) where new prcxlucts are higher quality than competitors' prcxlucts, meet customer needs better, and let the custaner perform a unique task.
Customer impact and features (factor 11), where new products strongly affect customer use behavior, offer unique features to the customer, and reduce the custaner 's costs. were considered (size, strengths, etc), it was the strategy elected and not the firm resources, which was linked to positive performance. The conclusion is that, while some industry characteristics obviously affect a firm's new prcx1uct performance, the strategy chosen --namely the Balanced Strategyhas a pronounced, positive and independent impact on performance. To answer the question of relative impacts i.e. strategy versus firm/industry characteristics, two way ANOVA's were used to test the separate effects of strategy cluster membership and firm/industry characteristics on nine performance measures. For this analysis, the sample of firms was split into two groups: cluster B versus the rest of the firms.
In the cas · e of firm strengths and sales, it was cluster membership and not company characteristics that were significantly tied to performance measures (significance of main effects).
In the case of industry characteristics, both main effects were significant (p=0.10). These results were confirmed with multiple regression analysis of each performance measure versus firm/industry charactertistics and cluster membership (cluster B versus other clusters; 0, 1 dummy variable).
The second question, namely the intervening effect of the firm/industry characteristics, was tested as follows: for each cluster, one-way ru;JOVA's were used to test the effect of firm/industry characteristics on performance.
The nine measures of performance were considered in conjunction with 12 firm and industry descriptors for each cluster separately: a total of 108 ANOVA's per cluster. For four clusters, a small number of significant relationships were uncovered, about the same number as one would expect by chance. But for cluster D, a large number of significant relationships (p=0. 10) were revealed.
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The answer to the second question was also conclusive, but additional insights were gained into what strategy works best. For four of the strategy groups --A,B,C and E --there was no evidence that the new product results achieved depended on the type of firm or industry. For example, Strategy B worked well, regardless of firm or industry. But one strategy type, namely the D-type firms who practiced a Low Budget, Conservative Strategy, was the exception. Here we found that this strategy, which gave satisfactory results overall, worked particularly well for certain types of companies:
Firms that were rated stronger than their competitors, particularly in the areas of salesf orce and distribution, outperformed other firms when electing Strategy D.
-Firms in higher growth, technologically developing industries fared more poo rly than other firms when chosing the D strategy.
The conclusion is that Strategy D --the Low Budget, C on servative Strategy --works best for stronger firms, particularly in the marketing area, and for firms in low growth, technologically mature industries. Note, however, that these results were still inferior to our top performing Strategy B companies.
Perhaps the most dramatic conclusion of this last analysis is that the and a strong market orientation, coupled with a highly focused program. And secorrl , they selected certain types of products arrl.markets for their product innovation effort. These market and product ty:pes were listed in the article, and become useful .guides to others in the selection and evaluation of business arenas or even new product projects.
This Balanced Strategy is one ideal that many firms may wish to emulate.
Note that we found that, while certain firm and industry characteristics did affect outcomes, electing this Balanced Strategy also had a strong and independent link to performance. These results reinforce the message that a sound new product strategy pays off. We also found that this Balanced
Strategy was a universally applicable one, yielding positive results regardless of firm or · industry type. And finally, Strategy B is reasonable and feasible. We know it is so, simply because a group of firms from differ e nt industries successfully implemented the Balanced Strategy and won!
